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I.   INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 1995, a nine-year-old boy named Jimmy Ryce
stepped off his school bus and disappeared. Months later, somebody
noticed the child’s backpack in a local ranch hand’s trailer. The ranch
hand, Juan Carlos Chavez, led authorities to Jimmy’s body. Jimmy
had been kidnapped, raped, murdered, and dismembered.1 Juan
Chavez was convicted of Jimmy’s murder on September 12, 1998.2
The boy’s parents, Don and Claudine Ryce, responded to their
son’s brutal murder by authoring and lobbying the Jimmy Ryce In-
voluntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’ Treat-
ment and Care Act (Jimmy Ryce Act).3 Governor Lawton Chiles
signed the Act into law on May 19, 1998,4 and it became effective
January 1, 1999.5 The Act defines certain sex offenders—“sexually
violent predators”—as having a mental abnormality and seeks to
have these offenders involuntarily and indefinitely committed to an
appropriate “secure facility” for treatment,6 but only after the offend-
ers have already served their criminal sentences in jail.7 Moreover, it
applies only to persons who have already been convicted of a sexually
violent crime.8
Although the Florida Legislature passed the Jimmy Ryce Act
unanimously, the Act is controversial to courts, academia, and civil
rights activists because it raises constitutional concerns: civil rights
violations under the Ex Post Facto and the Double Jeopardy Clauses
of the United States Constitution and the denial of substantive due
process rights. First, many argue that the new Florida law and the
recently enacted sexual predator commitment statutes in other
states are, in truth, only further punishment of despised criminals.
These critics argue that the Jimmy Ryce Act is a thinly veiled effort
to circumvent a disappointing criminal justice system by keeping
these criminals locked up long past their expired jail sentences.9
Such state action would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause (as to
                                                                                                                      
1. See Tom Bayles, Committee Approves Sex Offender Bill; Predators Would Be
Forced Into Treatment, FLA. TIMES UNION, Mar. 13, 1998, at B4; Jay Weaver, Measure
Could Delay Release of Violent Predators, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Apr. 21, 1998, at B6.
2. See Mike Schneider, Chavez Convicted of Ryce Murder, TALL. DEM., Sept. 19,
1998, at C5.
3. See New Law Keeps Pedophiles Institutionalized After Prison, FLA. TODAY, May
20, 1998, at B6.
4. See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’
Treatment and Care Act, ch. 98-64, § 24, 1998 Fla. Laws 445, 455 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
916.31-.49 (Supp. 1998)) (effective Jan. 1, 1999).
5. See id.
6. See FLA. STAT. § 916.37(2) (Supp. 1998).
7. See id. § 916.33(1).
8. See id. § 916.33(9).
9. See discussion infra Part III.
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criminals convicted prior to the enactment) and the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The other constitutional dilemma is whether the commitment
scheme violates substantive due process. Labeling sexually violent
predators as mentally insane is controversial because there is no
proof that predators have disturbed mental processes. Predators are
evil, not mad.10 Indeed, Claudine Ryce conceded that “[t]hese people
are not insane.”11 The danger in allowing states to blur this distinc-
tion, critics argue, is that any number of behavioral patterns are un-
usual; thus, any number of behavioral patterns could be labeled “in-
sane” by the state under legislation similar to the Jimmy Ryce Act.
Accordingly, by employing commitment in lieu of criminal prosecu-
tion and by labeling behavior insane rather than criminal, the state
could entirely circumvent the system of constitutional protections af-
forded to persons accused of crimes.
The Jimmy Ryce Act was patterned after a Kansas statute12 that
was found constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the
seminal case Kansas v. Hendricks.13 Because the Jimmy Ryce Act is
nearly identical to the Kansas statute, Hendricks presumably estab-
lishes the Act’s constitutionality. Therefore, understanding Hen-
dricks is essential to any debate concerning the constitutionality and
policy of the involuntary civil commitment of sexual predators under
the procedures established by the Jimmy Ryce Act.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court determined that the Kansas law
was a civil statute, not a criminal one, and therefore, certain consti-
tutional protections, such as the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses, were simply inapplicable.14 The Court also found that the
Kansas statute did not violate substantive due process require-
ments.15 The Court examined the history of civil commitment and de-
termined that the statute was, at heart, indistinguishable from other
constitutionally permissible civil commitment statutes.16 Since the
Kansas statute conformed to the historical substantive due process
requirements of involuntary civil commitment jurisprudence, it was
constitutional.
In this Comment I argue that the Jimmy Ryce Act represents an
unconstitutional blurring between civil commitment and criminal in-
carceration. The commitment procedures established by the Act are
outlined in Part II. In Part III, I challenge the conclusion that the
                                                                                                                      
10. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
11. Dana Calvo, New State Law Inspired by Jimmy Ryce Death; Some Sex Predators
to Be Held Longer, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., May 20, 1998, at B8 (quoting Claudine Ryce).
12. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a17 (1994).
13. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
14. See id. at 361.
15. See id. at 356.
16. See id. at 356-58.
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Jimmy Ryce Act is civil and not criminal, and in Part IV, I question
whether this Act legitimately defines sexual predators as “mentally
ill.” In conclusion, I analyze the potential consequences of blurring
the line between civil commitment and criminal incarceration.
II.   THE JIMMY RYCE ACT PROCEDURE FOR COMMITMENT AND
RELEASE
A.   Commitment
The Florida Legislature passed the Jimmy Ryce Act on May 1,
1998.17 The Act directs the Secretary of Children and Family Services
to create a multidisciplinary team that will determine whether an
inmate is a “sexually violent predator.”18 The only statutory guideline
for the team’s composition is that it must include “two licensed psy-
chiatrists or psychologists, or one licensed psychiatrist and one li-
censed psychologist.”19 One hundred and eighty days prior to releas-
ing an inmate convicted of a sexually violent crime,20 the agency con-
trolling the inmate must notify both the multidisciplinary team and
                                                                                                                      
17. See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’
Treatment and Care Act, ch. 98-64, 1998 Fla. Laws 445 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 916.31-
.49 (Supp. 1998)).
18. FLA. STAT. § 916.33(3) (Supp. 1998).
19. Id.
20. A “sexually violent offense” is defined as the following:
(a) Murder of a human being while engaged in sexual battery in violation of s.
782.04(1)(a)2;
(b) Kidnapping of a child under the age of 16 and, in the course of that of-
fense, committing:
1. Sexual battery; or
2. A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the
child;
(c) Committing the offense of false imprisonment upon a child under the age
of 16 and, in the course of that offense committing:
1. Sexual battery; or
2. A lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the
child;
(d) Sexual battery in violation of s. 794.011;
(e) Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of the
child in violation of s. 800.04;
(f) An attempt, criminal solicitation, or conspiracy, in violation of s. 777.04, of
a sexually violent offense;
(g) Any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time before October 1,
1998, which is comparable to a sexually violent offense under paragraphs (a)-(f)
or any federal conviction or conviction in another state for a felony offense that
in this state would be a sexually violent offense; or
(h) Any criminal act that, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or
subsequently during civil commitment proceedings under ss. 916.30-916.49,
has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually moti-
vated.
Id. § 916.32(8). The Act applies not only to persons convicted after its effective date, but
also to persons already in custody when the Act took effect. See id. § 916.45.
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the relevant state attorney of the inmate’s impending release.21 The
team then determines whether the inmate is a “sexually violent
predator.”22 A “sexually violent predator” is defined as “any person
who: (a) Has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) Suf-
fers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined
in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”23
Upon receipt of the team’s report and recommendation, the state
attorney may elect to file a petition requesting the inmate’s commit-
ment.24 After the petition for commitment has been filed, the judge
must determine if probable cause exists to believe the inmate is a
“sexually violent predator” within the meaning of the Act. If so, the
inmate must be taken into custody and held in “an appropriate se-
cure facility” until resolution of the commitment proceedings.25 The
state attorney may petition for an adversarial probable cause hear-
ing, and if one is granted, the respondent has a right to introduce
evidence, be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses, and
view and copy all reports and petitions in the file.26 The respondent,
however, is not entitled to petition the court for an adversarial
hearing; only the state attorney has this right.27
The trial for commitment is in many respects similar to a criminal
proceeding. It must occur within thirty days after the determination
of probable cause, unless either party shows good cause for a con-
tinuance.28 The respondent is entitled to counsel and may be ap-
pointed a public defender upon the requisite showing of indigence.29
Also, the respondent has a right to demand a trial by jury.30 A court
or jury determination that the respondent is a sexually violent
predator must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, and in
the event of a jury trial, the decision must be unanimous.31 If a
unanimous verdict is not forthcoming, but a majority of the jurors
would classify the respondent as a sexually violent predator, the
state attorney may request a new trial.32
                                                                                                                      
21. See id. § 916.33(1)(a).
22. Id. § 916.33(3).
23. Id. § 916.32(9). The definition of “sexually violent predator” will be analyzed and
discussed extensively in Part IV.
24. See id. § 916.34.
25. Id. § 916.35(4).
26. See id. § 916.35(1)-(2).
27. See id.
28. See id. § 916.36(1)-(2).
29. See id. § 916.36(3).
30. See id. § 916.36(5).
31. See id. § 916.37(1). The Kansas statute, found constitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court, requires a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a07(a) (1994); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 916.37(1) (Supp. 1998).
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Upon classification as a sexually violent predator, the respondent
is committed to the care of the Department of Children and Family
Services (Department).33 The Department must maintain sexually
violent predators in a secure facility segregated from civilly commit-
ted patients who were not committed under the Jimmy Ryce Act.34
B.   Release
During commitment, the inmate must be examined at least once
annually to determine whether the inmate’s dangerous condition has
changed.35 The court must hold a limited probable cause hearing to
determine whether probable cause exists “to believe that the person’s
condition has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at large
and that the person will not engage in acts of sexual violence if dis-
charged.”36 The inmate has a right to have counsel at the hearing but
does not have a right to be present.37
A determination of probable cause warrants the court to set a
trial.38 At this stage in the proceedings, however, the inmate has no
right to demand a jury trial. The inmate will remain committed if the
state proves its burden “by clear and convincing evidence, that the
person’s mental condition remains such that it is not safe for the per-
son to be at large and that, if released, the person is likely to engage
in acts of sexual violence.”39 Although an inmate may petition the
court for release at any time, if the petitioner has previously filed an
unsuccessful petition, the court may deny the petition if the court
deems that the petition does not contain facts warranting a probable
cause hearing.40
III.   DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND EX POST FACTO CLAUSES: IS THE
COMMITMENT OF SEXUAL PREDATORS SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR JAIL
SENTENCE A FUNDAMENTALLY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING?
A.   Kansas v. Hendricks
The crux of the majority opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks41 was that
the Kansas statute was civil, not criminal; therefore, the constitu-
tional protections of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses
                                                                                                                      
33. See id. § 916.37(2).
34. See id. Although the Act does not specifically prescribe the treatment and care of
the inmate, it broadly instructs that “long-term control, care, and treatment of a person
committed under [the Act] . . . must conform to constitutional requirements.” Id. § 916.42.
35. See id. § 916.38(1), (3).
36. Id. § 916.38(3).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id. § 916.38(4).
40. See id. § 916.40.
41. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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simply did not apply.42 The Court based its conclusion on an uncriti-
cal evaluation of the statutory language, thereby evading the more
difficult substantive constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the Kansas
Legislature unambiguously categorized the statute as civil by virtue
of the statute’s physical placement in the Kansas Probate Code.43 Ac-
cordingly, the Court stated it would not reject the Kansas Legisla-
ture’s designation unless the party challenging the statute proved
the statute to be so punitive as to negate the state’s express intent.44
The Court distinguished the civil commitment statute from criminal
punishment because the statute, according to the Court, did not im-
plicate the primary purposes of criminal punishment—deterrence
and retribution.45 The Court reasoned that the Kansas statute was
not retributive because prior criminal conduct was only relevant in
the commitment proceeding to the extent that it demonstrated a
“mental abnormality” or proved the requisite level of
dangerousness.46 Similarly, the Court explained that the statute was
not a deterrent because sexually violent predators were statutorily
defined as persons who lack volitional control over their actions.
Since it is axiomatic that unintentional behavior cannot be deterred,
punishment of sexually violent predators, likewise, cannot be dic-
tated by the deterrence rationale.47 Finally, the Court observed that
the confinement conditions called for by the Kansas statute were
more akin to ordinary civil commitment than to criminal detention.48
The Court’s reasoning fails in two respects. First, the Court re-
viewed the statute facially without examining the practical effect of
the words employed. Second, the Court used unsatisfying semantic
criteria (concededly established through Supreme Court precedent)
to analyze the distinction between civil legislation and criminal leg-
islation. By doing this, the Court not only failed to give appropriate
weight to the practical effect of this statute, it failed to consider how
to best accomplish the purposes of the Ex Post Facto and the Double
Jeopardy Clauses.
                                                                                                                      
42. See id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
43. See id.
44. See id. The Florida Legislature similarly asserts a civil code intent for the Jimmy
Ryce Act. See FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998).
45. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 363.
494 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:487
B.   The Practical Reality of the Jimmy Ryce Act
1.   National Trend
The Jimmy Ryce Act was enacted in the context of a national
movement to “get tough” on sex offenders. Although recent sexual
predator commitment statutes have been labeled “civil,” the legisla-
tive history indicates that these statutes are actually motivated by
punitive intent. For example, one commentator noted that the debate
in the Kansas Legislature over the enactment of a sexually violent
predator civil commitment statute revealed the Legislature’s lack of
concern for treatment and its predominant interest in keeping sex of-
fenders locked up indefinitely:
Debate in the Kansas Legislature focused on confinement of sex of-
fenders rather than treatment. Testifying before a legislative
committee, state Attorney General Robert Stephan stated[,] “You
have a rare opportunity to pass a law that will keep dangerous sex
offenders confined past their scheduled prison sentence.” Special
Assistant Attorney General, now Attorney General Carla Stovall,
stated[,] “We cannot open our prison doors and let these animals
back into our communities.” When the Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services informed the Kansas House Judiciary
Committee that, due to ineffective treatment, a civil commitment
for many sex offenders will amount to a life sentence, a member of
the Task Force promoting the legislation responded[,] “So be it.”49
Similarly, Minnesota recently responded to its own supreme court
ruling that vacated the commitment of a sexually violent predator by
holding a special legislative session to rewrite the law. During this
session, “[Governor] Carlson’s spokesman asserted that the governor
wished to change the basis of commitment ‘more toward penalty and
away from the presumption of rehabilitation,’ while his opponent for
the gubernatorial nomination declared that the test for civil com-
mitment should not be ‘the psychological state of the perpetrator.’”50
One United States Congressperson even promises to propose a na-
tional sexual predator commitment statute.51
                                                                                                                      
49. Hon. Tom Malone, The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act—Post Hendricks, J.
KAN. B.A., Feb.-Mar. 1998, at 36, 37 (footnotes omitted).
50. Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator
Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 775,
789 (1995).
51. See Calvo, supra note 11, at B8 (Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Repub., Miami).
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2.   Legislative History in Florida
In concert with this national trend, the Florida Legislature passed
the Jimmy Ryce Act in 1998.52 The history of the Act suggests that
the legislation could be a punitive response to a tragic crime.53
The Jimmy Ryce Act was part of a package of eleven bills filed in
the House and eight bills in the Senate designed to toughen laws
concerning sexual predators.54 Several of the bills suggested methods
to bolster community awareness, such as requiring state notification
to all schools and day-care centers regarding a sexual offender’s re-
lease into their area,55 requiring sexual predators to bear automobile
tags identifying them as such,56 and lengthening the time they will
be labeled as sexual predators after parole.57 These efforts followed
closely on the heels of a chemical castration statute enacted by the
Florida Legislature in 199758 and tougher sentencing guidelines es-
tablished by the Legislature in 1995.59
The impetus for the Jimmy Ryce Act in Florida may have
stemmed in part from perceived weaknesses in the criminal justice
system. One newspaper reporting on the Jimmy Ryce Act expressed
the public frustration concerning plea bargains and light sentences
in sex offender cases as follows:
Only two of the 11 men listed as sexual predators in Broward
County ever served time in prison.
. . . .
All four registered predators in Palm Beach County bypassed
prison and went directly to probation, although all were charged
with sex crimes against children.
Statewide, 75 percent of 577 sexual offenders found guilty since
November 1995 received shorter sentences than called for in state
                                                                                                                      
52. See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’
Treatment and Care Act, ch. 98-64, 1998 Fla. Laws 445 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 916.31-
.49 (Supp. 1998)).
53. See supra Part I. In this respect, the Jimmy Ryce Act follows a string of legislation
inspired by tragic crimes. Examples include “Jenna’s Law,” ending parole for violent felons,
“Megan’s Law,” regarding community notification of the location of sex offenders, and
“Joan’s Law,” imposing life-without-parole on child murderers. See Dale Russakoff, Out of
Grief Comes a Legislative Force, WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at A1.
54. See Thomas B. Pfankuch, Bills Would Prey on Sexual Predators, FLA. TIMES
UNION, Apr. 17, 1998, at B1.
55. See Fla. HB 3737 (1998). On May 28, 1999, House Bill 3737 became law without
the Governor’s signature. See Act effective July 1, 1998, ch. 98-267, 1998 Fla. Laws 2289
(amending FLA. STAT. § 775.21 (1997)).
56. See Fla. SB 310 (1998) (died in committee).
57. See Fla. SB 514 (1998) (vetoed by the Governor).
58. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-184, 1997 Fla. Laws 3455 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 794.0235 (1997)).
59. See Ardy Friedberg & Ty Tagami, Experts: Toughen Up on Predators; Still, They
Disagree on Notification and Treatment, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Mar. 8, 1997, at A1.
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guidelines.
. . . .
. . . [E]ven designated predators are not likely to go to prison.
Harried prosecutors with weak cases often settle for guilty pleas in
exchange for lighter sentences.
“They end up getting probation almost regardless of how serious
their offense was, and putting them on a list is a pale substitute,
and a lame one, for keeping them in prison,” said John Morin, a
Lauderhill psychologist who treats sex offenders.
Of the 350 offenders he has treated over the past five years, only
four went to trial, Morin said. The rest bargained their way out of
potentially tougher sentences, which might have included prison.
Although many predators were convicted before tougher sentenc-
ing guidelines were established by the Legislature in 1995, results
since then suggest they still slip through the judicial system with
light sentences.
Of the 26 people convicted of sex offenses against minors in
Broward since the new guidelines became effective, 23 were given
lighter sentences than the guidelines specified, typically because of
plea bargains.
The situation is similar in Palm Beach County, where 32 of 36
such offenders were sentenced below the guidelines. In Dade, 44 of
46 got lighter sentences.60
Thus, part of the motivation for seeking redress through civil com-
mitment may have been loss of faith in the state’s criminal justice
system. While understandable, this sentiment strictly undermines
our system of jurisprudence. Constitutional protections afforded
those who have been charged with crimes must not be so easily cir-
cumvented.
The lack of funding for the Jimmy Ryce Act further undermines
the notion that Florida will use this program as a genuine attempt at
treatment. Although the Department of Children and Family Serv-
ices estimated the potential first-year cost of the program to be $60.6
million, less than $4 million was allocated.61 After the first year, costs
are expected to rise to over $100 million per year;62 moreover, if each
predator is committed for a “very long-term” as the Jimmy Ryce Act
anticipates,63 that figure will grow each year.64 Proponents of the Act
                                                                                                                      
60. Id.
61. See Candace J. Samolinski, Chiles Signs Sexual Predators Law, TAMPA TRIB., May
20, 1998, at 1.
62. See Grace Frank, Costs Hinder Jimmy Ryce Act, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 13, 1998, at 8.
63.  FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998) (“It is therefore the intent of the Legislature to
create a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of sexually vio-
lent predators.”).
64. See Candace J. Samolinski, When Predators Walk After Horrible Cases of Sexual
Abuse, the Florida Legislature Considers Placing Released Convicts in Mental Institutions,
TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 1, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Samolinski, When Predators Walk] (noting
that, by the year 2000, the program could cost $158.6 million per year); see also Candace J.
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deny that the Department’s estimates are accurate;65 however, fig-
ures indicate that the allotted amount is inadequate. Kansas, for ex-
ample, spent $700,000 to treat fifteen men66 while Washington spent
$65,000 per predator.67 Similarly, psychologists indicate that “[t]he
average cost of private residential treatment is $50,000 to $60,000 a
year for each patient.”68 About 8000 predators will be released in
1999 in Florida, roughly 600 of whom the Department expects to be
committed.69 Representative Alex Villalobos,70 the Act’s sponsor, es-
timated that only 60 offenders would be committed in the first year.71
However, the Department warned against underestimating the fig-
ure, commenting that in “[s]tates like Wisconsin and Minnesota that
have had the program in place have admitted they expected 10 to 12
people a year and have ended up with 50 or 60.”72 Although the range
of reasonable cost estimates varies, it is safe to conclude that the
Legislature funded the project with a minimal, even draconian
amount. Because all of those committed must be housed and fed, the
gross deficiency in the budget will presumably result in inadequate
treatment.
3.   Substantive Provisions of the Jimmy Ryce Act and the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act that Indicate Punitive Effect and
Intent
(a)   Practical Effect
Although the legislative history of the Jimmy Ryce Act reveals the
punitive intent of the Florida Legislature, the Act’s substantive pro-
visions themselves provide the best evidence of the Act’s punitive ef-
                                                                                                                      
Samolinski, Kansas Law Used for Jimmy Ryce Act, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 26, 1998, at 1
[hereinafter Samolinski, Kansas Law] (“Operating costs are estimated at $60 million the
first year and projected to climb to nearly $200 million over the next two years.”).
65. See, e.g., Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1 (noting that Sen.
Alberto Gutman, Repub., Miami, “scoffed at the department’s price estimates”); see also
Jay Weaver, Measure Could Delay Release of Violent Predators, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Apr.
21, 1998, at B6 (stating that Rep. Alex Villalobos, Repub., Miami, estimated that each in-
mate would cost $30,000 per year, while the Department estimates the figure at $100,000
per year). Rep. Villalobos indicated he expected the number of persons committed in Flor-
ida to be half that of California, where only 80 sex offenders were committed last year. See
Jackie Hallifax, House Passes “Jimmy Ryce” Bill, ASSOC. PRESS POL. SERV., Apr. 20, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7406260. However, the Department anticipates 600 commitments in
the first year, and it notes that though California only committed 80 in the first two years,
it has 330 inmates awaiting decisions. See id.
66. See Samolinski, Kansas Law, supra note 64, at 1.
67. See Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1.
68. Samolinski, supra note 61, at 1.
69. See Frank, supra note 62, at 8.
70. Repub., Miami.
71. See Calvo, supra note 11, at B8.
72. Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1 (quoting Brent Taylor, at-
torney for Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs.).
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fect and purpose. Both the Kansas and Florida statutes require that
the respondent be found both to have a mental abnormality causing a
predisposition to commit sexually violent crimes and to be “danger-
ous.” Paradoxically, the only evidence from which to deduce these
findings and, hence, to characterize the respondent’s current condi-
tion, is the respondent’s past criminal conduct. Since the commit-
ment trial is held after the inmate has completed serving the original
sentence, the conduct that was the basis of the conviction is the last
record of the inmate’s interaction with the outside community. Any
rehabilitation occurring during the period of incarceration may be
discredited because the inmate’s incapacitation has foreclosed any
opportunity to reoffend. The resulting practical effect of the statutory
scheme is to permit the fact finder to use past conduct as the sole cri-
teria for making these factual findings. Thus, the distinction between
finding that the offender has a present mental abnormality or merely
finding that he should be further punished for past behavior is
blurred.
(b)   Punitive Intent
The very title of the Act, “The Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil
Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’ Treatment and Care
Act,” intimates that, like ordinary civil commitment statutes, the Act
focuses on treatment and care of mentally ill persons. The Jimmy
Ryce Act explicitly requires the level of treatment and care that is
constitutionally mandated,73 and proponents of the bill touted the
need for treatment of sexual predators.74 However, several factors
belie treatment as the primary motivation for the Jimmy Ryce Act.
First, effective treatment is not medically available for sexual offend-
ers.75 The statute itself is inconsistent on this point because it re-
quires treatment even though it asserts that sexually violent preda-
tors “are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modali-
ties.”76
In determining the Kansas statute’s constitutionality, the major-
ity in Hendricks noted that the statute applied not only to persons
convicted of a sexually violent crime, but also to those who had been
absolved of criminal responsibility.77 Accordingly, the Court reasoned
                                                                                                                      
73. See FLA. STAT. § 916.42 (Supp. 1998).
74. See, e.g., Senate Oks Bill to Treat Sex Offenders: Inmates Would Undergo Therapy
After Prison Terms, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 25, 1998, at B8 (“We are going to take these people,
after due process has been served, and put them in a facility where they can be treated.”
(quoting Sen. Ron Klein. Dem., Boca Raton)); Tom Bayles, supra note 1, at B4 (“In no way
is this punishment although it gets them off the streets for treatment.” (quoting Sen. Al-
berto Gutman, Repub., Miami)).
75. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
76. FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998).
77. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).
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that the motive for the commitment was not to punish past deeds.78
Significantly, Florida’s Jimmy Ryce Act requires a criminal convic-
tion or acquittal by reason of insanity in defining a “sexually violent
predator.”79 Consequently, the argument can be applied in the oppo-
site manner. Under the Jimmy Ryce Act, a criminal conviction is an
element necessary to be proven; whether a past conviction alone will
be sufficient for a finding of “mental abnormality” following Hen-
dricks remains to be seen.80
Another indication of punitive intent revealed in the substantive
provisions of the Act is the absence of alternatives less restrictive
than total and indefinite confinement. In the involuntary commit-
ment of a nondangerous mentally ill patient, Florida law requires the
state to prove that there are no adequate, less restrictive alternatives
to total confinement.81 Commitment is not constitutional if mentally
ill patients can receive treatment and live in relative freedom with-
out deteriorating to the point where they become a danger to them-
selves.82
Similarly, Florida law provides for less restrictive alternatives in
the case of insanity acquittees. Under criminal rules of procedure, a
court may order appropriate out-patient care in lieu of total confine-
ment.83 The Jimmy Ryce Act does not contain such a less restrictive
alternative requirement, though it requires a finding that the person
is “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a se-
cure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”84 It remains
to be seen whether the courts will construe this language as requir-
ing that no less restrictive alternative will adequately protect against
future violations; nonetheless, the lack of provisions for other alter-
natives is evidence of the Legislature’s punitive intent.
The similar lack of any provision for treatment or monitoring of
an offender following release from commitment prompts the question
whether the Legislature contemplated the offender’s eventual release
at all. Kansas officials warned the Florida Legislature that it needed
to provide for the eventual release of the persons to be committed, in-
cluding follow-up care and treatment.85 The administrator of the
country’s first predator commitment program in Washington re-
                                                                                                                      
78. See id.
79. See FLA. STAT. § 916.32(2), (9)(a) (Supp. 1998).
80. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.a.
81. See In re Smith, 342 So. 2d 491, 491 (Fla. 1977) (citing In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d
481 (Fla. 1977)) (reversing and remanding to determine if there was a “less restrictive al-
ternative” to involuntary commitment for mental illness); Reigosa v. State, 362 So. 2d 714,
715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (remanding to determine the possibility of “less restrictive alterna-
tives” to involuntary commitment for mental illness).
82. See Reigosa, 362 So. 2d at 715.
83. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.217(b).
84. FLA. STAT. § 916.32(9)(b) (Supp. 1998).
85. See Samolinski, supra note 61, at 1.
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peated this warning, noting that Washington has very stringent af-
ter-release monitoring requirements.86 Florida eschewed this advice,
neglecting to provide follow-up treatment or commitment procedures
for determining whether a less restrictive alternative would be ade-
quate to care for the inmate and protect society.
In the context of insanity acquittees, Florida courts have found
that although Florida statutes do not expressly permit conditional
release of persons committed, such authority is inherently vested in
the court by virtue of its continuing jurisdiction over the person
committed.87 One court noted:
The alternative is to condemn all those who are not utterly free of
an underlying mental illness to lifelong commitment in a mental
hospital, regardless of the degree to which they can function and
exercise control over themselves in society and regardless of the
therapeutic effect of exposure to the outside world. In effect, de-
nying the possibility of conditional release is “tantamount to an
elaborate mask for preventive detention” of the mentally ill.88
Finally, the Jimmy Ryce Act calls for treatment and commitment
only after the state has extracted a full measure of punishment in
the state’s prison system. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in
Hendricks, any act that provides for treatment only after time has
been served begins to look like punishment—a means to keep the
criminal locked up—not a means to treat a sick mind.89
A related argument is that both of these recent sexual predator
commitment statutes effectively create a controversial branch of
mental illness that ostensibly justifies involuntary civil commit-
ment.90 This new branch is termed a “mental abnormality” and is de-
fined as “a mental condition affecting a person’s emotional or voli-
tional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually vio-
lent offenses.”91 If, as indicated by the majority opinion in Hendricks,
this definition means that a sexually violent predator lacks volitional
control over his or her actions, the Legislature would be expected to
eschew criminal punishment altogether, opting instead for civil
commitment in the first instance. In other words, if these legislatures
truly endorse the controversial perspective that persons who commit
sexually violent crimes suffer from a mental illness, and that condi-
tion makes them a danger to society, then it should not assess crimi-
nal culpability. In the normal course of action, those who commit
                                                                                                                      
86. See Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1.
87. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190, 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
88. Id.
89. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 381 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
91. FLA. STAT. § 916.32(5) (Supp. 1998).
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crimes due to mental illness are not prosecuted; they are commit-
ted.92
C.   The Hendricks Court’s Deference to Semantic Differences Between
the Words Civil and Criminal and Its Failure to Give Effect to the
Purposes of the Ex Post Facto and the Double Jeopardy Clauses
1.   Precedents Defining a Statute as Civil or Criminal
The methods historically employed by the Supreme Court to de-
termine whether a statute is civil or criminal seem generally unhelp-
ful in analyzing the sexually violent predator commitment schemes.
Concededly, where a legislature expresses the intent that a statute
be construed as a civil statute, the Court will not find contrary intent
unless the statute is so punitive in purpose or practical effect as to
negate the expressly declared intent of the legislature.93 The Court
has considered the following factors when deciding whether a statute
is civil or criminal:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint; whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned . . . .94
In Hendricks, the Court’s application of these factors to the Kan-
sas sexual predator commitment statute failed in two respects. First,
the Court accepted the facial designation of the state action as “civil
commitment” for purposes of analyzing these factors.95 The Court
seemed to assume arguendo that the statute called for civil commit-
ment. Then, using the civil commitment paradigm created through
historic precedent, the Court concluded that this statute was indis-
tinguishable from ordinary civil commitment, so it was civil. For ex-
ample, the Hendricks Court noted that civil commitment is not tradi-
tionally construed as punishment.96 This analysis begs the question;
the very point to be made is that these sexually violent predator
commitment acts do not call for civil commitment in any legitimate
sense. Presumably, being locked up in a cell indefinitely is punish-
                                                                                                                      
92. See discussion infra Part IV.
93. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986).
94. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted),
cited with approval in Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.
95. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.
96. See id. at 363.
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ment, regardless of whether the shingle over the institutional door
reads “jail” or “hospital.”
Similarly, by accepting the “civil commitment” classification, the
Court found that no particular offense had been created to invoke
commitment under the Kansas statute; yet the trial for the non-
offense contained essentially criminal procedural safeguards.97 Again
facially construing the statute, the Court cited the lack of a scienter
element as evidence of the Kansas Legislature’s non-punitive pur-
pose.98 However, to the extent that the statute applied to persons
who had been convicted of a prior sex offense requiring scienter, the
Legislature effectively incorporated this scienter requirement. Be-
cause the Court accepted the civil commitment paradigm for its
analysis, it failed to note that the statute, though arguably formalis-
tically indistinguishable from civil commitment statutes, was simi-
larly indistinguishable from continued criminal incarceration.
The primary purpose of the sexual predator commitment statutes
is incapacitation,99 which can be either civil or criminal.100 The ma-
jority of the Hendricks Court denied that the Kansas statute served a
general deterrent purpose because a sexually violent predator by
definition could not control his or her behavior.101 The dissent pointed
out, however, that criminal incarceration not only serves a general
deterrence purpose as a threat of punishment to would-be criminals,
but it also serves as specific deterrence by incapacitating those who
have committed crimes.102 On occasions prior to Hendricks, the U.S.
Supreme Court has observed: “It would be archaic to limit the defini-
tion of ‘punishment’ to ‘retribution.’ Punishment serves several pur-
poses: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent—and preventive. One of
the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep
them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprison-
ment any the less punishment.”103
As with criminal incarceration, civil commitment serves multiple
purposes, only one of which is incapacitation. Civil commitment is
traditionally justified under either the state’s parens patriae power
                                                                                                                      
97. See id. at 370-71 (explaining the inapplicability to the Kansas statute of the suc-
cessive prosecution “same elements” test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932), and concluding the statute survives a Double Jeopardy Clause challenge).
98. See id. at 362.
99. See, e.g., Calvo, supra note 11, at B8; see also, Samolinski, When Predators Walk,
supra note 64, at 1 (citing the lack of a statutory monitoring plan to indicate confinement
as the Jimmy Ryce Act’s primary thrust).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (holding that the pur-
pose of deterrence may serve both civil and criminal goals).
101. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.
102. See id. at 380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
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or its police power.104 According to its parens patriae role, the state is
obligated to provide and care for individuals who, due to a mental
condition, cannot provide for themselves.105 The corollary doctrine of
police power obligates the state to protect its citizens from danger-
ous, mentally ill persons.106 When the state acts under its police
power, it acts to incapacitate the mentally ill persons—a deterrent
purpose. Thus, confinement on the basis of incapacitation serves both
civil and criminal purposes.
The Court should look beyond semantic differences between com-
mon, historical uses of the words civil and criminal to determine the
practical effect of the statute and to promote the purposes of the con-
stitutional protections sought to be enforced. As noted above, the
practical effects of the Jimmy Ryce Act prove it to be so punitive as to
outweigh the Legislature’s nominal civil designation. Moreover,
analysis of the purposes of the Ex Post Facto and the Double Jeop-
ardy Clauses reveals that the purposes of these provisions can be
best served by treating the Jimmy Ryce Act as criminal punishment.
2.   Purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses
(a)   Ex Post Facto Clause
The Federal Ex Post Facto Clause107 prohibits states from enact-
ing legislation that relates back to a prior act if the legislation does
the following: (1) outlaws behavior which was innocent when the
prior act was committed; (2) “aggravates” the crime, making it a
greater crime than when it was committed; (3) increases the pun-
ishment for the offense; or (4) alters the rules of evidence unfavora-
bly to the defendant making it easier to obtain a conviction.108 How-
ever, the Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to “criminal statutes”109
and serves two primary purposes: it promotes fairness by protecting
an individual’s expectations as to the probable outcome of his or her
behavior, and it regulates the functioning of our government by pre-
venting legislative abuses, thereby maintaining a system of law, not
of men.110
                                                                                                                      
104. See KENT S. MILLER, MANAGING MADNESS: THE CASE AGAINST CIVIL
COMMITMENT 16 (1976).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 16-18.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
108. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
109. See id. at 390-91; California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-05
(1995) (finding that although the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids retroactively increasing
punishment for criminal acts, it does not forbid an amendment that decreases the fre-
quency of parole suitability hearings available to a petitioner convicted prior to the
amendment).
110. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629-32 (1988).
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(b)   Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that a person shall not be
punished twice for the same offense.111 This principle “has been de-
clared by many jurists to be a part of the universal law of reason, jus-
tice, and conscience.”112 The rule against multiple punishments pro-
tects the individual by avoiding unnecessary harassment and social
stigma, economizing time and money, and protecting “the interest in
psychological security.”113 However, the prohibition serves an impor-
tant institutional purpose as well. Having a fixed punishment is a
hallmark of legitimate governance; a system that would permit the
government to seek a second punishment merely because it was dis-
satisfied with the initial sentence imposed would be tyrannical.
Thus, the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses seek to protect
both the individual and the adjudicative institution. The sexual
predator commitment procedures at issue in Hendricks and those
created by the Jimmy Ryce Act seek to circumvent the protections af-
forded the criminal justice system by our Constitution merely by la-
beling one pattern of behavior civilly insane rather than criminal.
This abuse of process is the very systemic failure these clauses seek
to prevent.
IV.   SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A.   Substantive Due Process and Involuntary Civil Commitment
The U.S. Supreme Court has established two criteria to be met for
involuntary commitment to satisfy the substantive due process re-
quirements of the Federal Constitution: the person to be committed
must be “mentally ill” and must be dangerous to himself or society.114
In the civil context, these criteria must be established by some stan-
dard of proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence, though the
criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary.115
Although the Court has never sought to impose any certain definition
of mental illness upon state legislatures, it is clear that there are
some limits upon the state’s authority to categorize individuals as in-
sane for commitment purposes. Even if a person has an antisocial
personality and may pose a danger to society, that person cannot be
committed unless he also has a mental illness.116 This is because such
                                                                                                                      
111. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. JAY A. SIGLER, Preface to DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND
SOCIAL POLICY v (1969) (citing United States v. Keen, 27 F. Cas. 686 (C.C.D. Ind. 1839)
(No. 15,510).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992).
115. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979).
116. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
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a person is indistinguishable from most persons who commit crimes
and are punished under our criminal justice system.117
Additionally, the state is constricted from punishing or commit-
ting persons solely for having “evil” thoughts. The state must prove
the defendant is dangerous, that he or she presents a threat of actual
harm to himself or others.118 Where a person suffers from a mental
illness, but poses no actual danger to himself or society, he may not
be committed because this condition does not justify the massive in-
vasion of the patient’s personal liberty that indefinite commitment
imposes.119 Thus, while the state is not wholly free to categorize men-
tally ill people for commitment purposes, the state may constitution-
ally seek preventive detention of individuals who have some mental
condition that causes them to be a danger to themselves or others.
Sexual predator commitment statutes like the Jimmy Ryce Act fa-
cially require such a condition.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court granted wide deference to the
state legislature in defining mental illness, stating, “As we have ex-
plained regarding congressional enactments, when a legislature ‘un-
dertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncer-
tainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.’”120 Though the Court
did not expressly state the applicable standard of review, its lan-
guage and analysis were consistent with a minimal rationality test.121
Opponents of the sexual predator commitment statutes would argue
that heightened scrutiny is appropriate, as it would permit the Court
to reach beyond the statute’s requirement of a mental abnormality to
critically analyze the legislative intent and practical effect.
In substantive due process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court uses
both minimal rationality review and strict scrutiny.122 Federalist and
separation of powers doctrines dictate that the Court give deference
to the reasonable acts of state legislatures.123 Accordingly, in most
cases where state legislation is challenged as violative of substantive
due process, the Court will subject the statute to a minimal rational-
ity or rational basis review.124 Under this extremely deferential and
permissive test, “the government action is presumed to be constitu-
tional, and [the] claimant has the burden of proving that the depriva-
                                                                                                                      
117. See id. at 82-83.
118. See id. at 75-76.
119. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
120. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997) (quoting Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)).
121. See generally id. at 359-60.
122. See James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 105 (1996).
123. See generally id. at 95-105.
124. See id. at 105.
506 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:487
tion is not even an arguably rational method for furthering any con-
ceivable valid government interest.”125 The Court will not second-
guess the state legislature by reviewing its motives or by requiring it
to justify either its factual findings or the effectiveness of the statu-
tory scheme in light of its stated objectives.126
Strict scrutiny is reserved for the rare instances where the legisla-
tion implicates a fundamental right.127 When the Court adopts strict
scrutiny, it requires the state to prove that the statute is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest.128 Using this test, the
Court rigorously analyzes the legislature’s motive and intent, and
subjects its findings to careful scrutiny to ensure that no less drastic
measure exists to adequately protect the state’s compelling inter-
est.129
Although freedom from bodily restraint in the form of involuntary
commitment would seem to be a rudimentary liberty interest, it is
unclear whether the Supreme Court considers it a “fundamental
right” triggering strict scrutiny under substantive due process juris-
prudence. In Hendricks, the Court did not explicitly adopt any par-
ticular standard of review, but it appeared to apply a minimum ra-
tionality test. The Court acknowledged that “freedom from physical
restraint ‘has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary government action,’” but it em-
phasized that this liberty interest is not absolute.130
The Court in Hendricks was willing to sacrifice this liberty inter-
est so long as the involuntary commitment occurred “pursuant to
proper procedures and evidentiary standards.”131 Moreover, the Court
declared itself to be especially inclined to deference in light of the sci-
entific uncertainties surrounding the nature of sexual predation.132
The dissent appears to agree with the majority as to the requisite
level of deference, stating that “the Constitution gives States a de-
gree of leeway in making this kind of determination.”133 Echoing the
majority as to deference in light of scientific uncertainty, the dissent
stated, “The psychiatric debate . . . helps to inform the law by setting
the bounds of what is reasonable, but it cannot here decide just how
states must write their laws within those bounds.”134 By apparently
                                                                                                                      
125. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L.
REV. 625, 643-44 (1992).
126. See id. at 644-45.
127. See Galloway, supra note 125, at 638-39.
128. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
129. See Galloway, supra note 125, at 638-39.
130. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
131. Id. at 357.
132. See id. at 360 n.3.
133. Id. at 374 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 375.
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applying a reasonableness review, the Court in Hendricks implicitly
rejected the notion of freedom from involuntary commitment as a
fundamental right. The Court failed to acknowledge this result ex-
plicitly, and it offered no explanation as to why such a massive cur-
tailment of individual liberty did not warrant strict scrutiny.
Supreme Court precedent on this point is inconsistent and un-
helpful. For example, in Foucha v. Louisiana,135 the Court struck
down a state law allowing continued confinement of an insanity ac-
quittee because he was no longer mentally ill. The Court noted the
“‘importance and fundamental nature’ of the individual’s right to lib-
erty,” stating that “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been
at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .”136
Having noted the important interest at stake, however, the Court
failed to adopt any recognized standard of review. Although the
Court stated that “due process requires that the nature of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the in-
dividual is committed,”137 suggesting a rational relationship test, the
Court invalidated the statute because it was not “sharply focused,”
nor “carefully limited,”138 suggesting heightened scrutiny. Justice
Thomas pointedly criticized the majority for this ambiguity and for
its failure to state specifically what right was at issue and whether it
was fundamental.139
Proponents of the sexual predator commitment statutes argue
that deference to the state legislature is appropriate because the
definition of mental illness has a normative component that is le-
gitimately determined only by the state. Moreover, they claim the ro-
bust debate in the scientific community concerning the nature of
sexual predation and its characterization as a “mental illness” is evi-
dence that the legislature acted permissibly.140 However, under these
commitment acts, the person to be committed would be free but for
these statutes. Thus, while a convicted felon may not have a funda-
mental right to freedom from bodily restraint prior to serving his or
her sentence, persons involuntarily committed do. If freedom from
indefinite involuntary commitment is not a fundamental right, what
could be?
                                                                                                                      
135. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
136. Id. at 80 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
137. Id. at 79.
138. Id. at 81.
139. See id. at 116-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that rational basis review
was appropriate). See also generally The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106
HARV. L. REV. 210 (1992) (discussing the Court’s departure from the ordinary substantive
due process two-tier framework).
140. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373-74 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
508 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:487
B.   “Mental Abnormality” as Satisfying the “Mental Illness”
Requirement for Involuntary Commitment
The proposition that persons who commit sex related crimes are
“mentally ill” is controversial in the scientific and legal communities.
The Kansas and Florida statutes create a new category of “mental
illness” for sexually violent predators. Both statutes describe a
“sexually violent predator” as a person who suffers from a “mental
abnormality,” defined in both as a “mental condition affecting a per-
son’s emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses.”141 This new category has been
criticized because it is circular and ambiguous, has no medical ana-
log, and blurs the distinction between the criminal and the insane.
1.   The Definition Is Circular and Ambiguous
Critics have condemned the definition of “mental abnormality” in
recent sexual predator acts as a mere tautology.142 A sexually violent
predator must have a mental abnormality predisposing that person
to commit sexually violent acts,143 but mental abnormality is also de-
fined by the propensity to commit violent acts.144 Thus, the criminal
behavior is the cause, the symptom, and the effect of the purported
abnormality.145 In its amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court in
                                                                                                                      
141. FLA. STAT. § 916.32(5), (9) (Supp. 1998); accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a), (b)
(1997).
142. See Amicus Brief for the Washington State Psychiatric Assoc. in Support of Re-
spondent at 16, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (citing Young v.
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750 (W.D. Wash. 1995)) [hereinafter WSPA Brief].
143. See FLA. STAT. § 916.32(9) (Supp. 1998) (defining “sexually violent predator” as
any person who “[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense” and who “[s]uffers from
a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treat-
ment”) (emphasis added).
144. See id. § 916.31 (defining “mental abnormality” as a “mental condition affecting a
person’s emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses”).
145. See Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 908 (1994).
McCaffrey describes the circularity problem as follows:
Another possible danger is that “‘mental abnormality’ will be established in a
circular manner only by virtue of the sexual offending behavior itself. In that
case, the abnormality is derived from the sexual behavior which in turn is used
to establish the predisposition to other sexual behavior.” It has also been ar-
gued that the term “‘mental abnormality’ has no clinically significant meaning
and no recognized diagnostic use.” . . . Thus, the “causative relationship that
must be shown under the statute between the disorder and the criminal sexual
behavior . . . is often a matter of speculation or meaningless circularity.”
Id. (citations omitted); see also John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permis-
sible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1319-20 (1996)
(noting the circularity problem but arguing that under such definitions, not all persons
who have committed sexually violent crimes will be found to have mental illnesses); Ham-
mel, supra note 50, at 796 (addressing the circularity in a similar Washington statute).
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Hendricks, the Washington State Psychiatric Association (WSPA) de-
scribed the circular effect of the definitions in these acts.146 Since a
personality disorder is merely a label attached to recognized patterns
of behavior, the state can label some pattern of behavior a “personal-
ity disorder,” then declare that disorder a mental illness worthy of
commitment.147 As the WSPA points out, however, this process is a
chicken-and-egg problem of causation.148
Moreover, not only is the criminal misconduct the a priori mani-
festation of the “mental abnormality” under these acts, it also estab-
lishes the “dangerousness” element necessary to satisfy substantive
due process for civil commitment. The Supreme Court has held that
conviction for a crime may create a presumption of dangerousness.149
Thus, the dangerousness element for sex offenders is established by
virtue of having been convicted of a sex crime. If the two elements
constituting the definition of mental abnormality collapse into one
requirement—criminal behavior—then the criminal behavior ipso
facto establishes the basis for commitment. This collapse into one
previously proven requirement raises the specter of double jeopardy
where the person to be committed already has served one criminal
sentence for that prior behavior.
If one concedes that the definition calls for some condition that
causes the criminal behavior, the problem of vagueness must still be
addressed. The terms “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder”
are so overinclusive as to include a whole range of people, from nico-
tine addicts to persons with rabid mental illnesses.150 Indeed, though
the acts are restricted to sex offenders, the same logic could uphold
commitment of a variety of repeat offenders, such as bank robbers or
drunk drivers.151 The only limit for defining mental illness supplied
by the Hendricks Court was that the Court’s approval of the Kansas
definition of mental illness apparently hinged on the fact that the
statutory definition narrows the class of potentially eligible offenders
to those who have a condition “that makes it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”152 Additionally,
Justice Kennedy warned in his concurring opinion that while the
Hendricks case appeared to meet the constitutional requirements for
mental illness, Supreme Court precedent would not uphold cases in
                                                                                                                      
146. See WSPA Brief, supra note 142, at 17.
147. See id. at 17-18.
148. See id.
149. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1983).
150. See Leading Case—Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111
HARV. L. REV. 259, 267-68 (1997).
151. See id. at 268; see also Brian J. Pollock, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable
Standard for “Mental Illness” or a Push Down the Slippery Slope Toward State Abuse of
Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 346-48 (1998).
152. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
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the future if “mental abnormality” proved to be “too imprecise a cate-
gory to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justi-
fied.”153 Justice Kennedy offered no guiding principles for defining
mental illness, apparently opting instead to leave that task to the
crucible of future case-by-case development.154
2.   The Definition Has No Scientific Analog
(a)   Do Sexual Predators Suffer from a “Mental Illness?”
Another criticism of the new category of mental illness created in
the sexual predator commitment acts is that the category is a purely
legal creation, without a scientific, medical basis.155 Ordinarily, psy-
chiatrists speak of “mental illness” only when a person’s cognitive or
functioning process is distorted.156 As one psychiatrist noted:
[M]ental illness is different in that it affects the decision-making
process of the organism, it affects his mind, disturbs his intellec-
tual ability such as memory, concentration, abstract thinking and
judgment, disturbs the process of logical thought, impairs verbal
communication, affects the symbolic processes and alienates the
victim from his environment and from himself.157
Abnormal behavior, such as criminal acts of sexual violence, do not
indicate a “mental illness” unless the perpetrator’s thought processes
have been distorted by mental disease.158 The American Psychiatric
Association noted, “Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious,
or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and
society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual . . . .”159 A sex offender is
not mentally ill because he has an “abnormal” desire and a willing-
ness to act on it.160 Instead, this “antisocial” behavior is characteristic
of many types of offenders—it makes the perpetrator criminal, not
insane.161
                                                                                                                      
153. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., James D. Reardon, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A
Psychiatrist’s Perspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 849 (1992) (discussing that the
Washington Legislature passed the Washington Sexually Violent Predators Act, which was
drafted without the participation of a psychiatrist).
156. See id. at 852 (“A psychiatrist’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ includes the loss of
contact with reality, confusion, loss of reason, or hallucinations.”).
157. MICHAEL ALFRED PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE
PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY 55 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1975).
158. See id.
159.  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS xxii (4th ed. 1994).
160. See Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health
System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 161, 188 (1995).
161. See, e.g., Reardon, supra note 155, at 851.
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Critics of the sexually violent predator commitment acts argue
that mental illness is not the cause of a predator’s actions.162 Instead,
the sexual predator simply lacks the moral restraint to refrain from
acting on sexual impulses.163 One commentator criticized the mental
disorder component of recent sexually violent predator acts, noting
that nothing in the definitions of these acts indicated “anything other
than desire to engage in criminal conduct and willingness to act on
that desire.”164 Furthermore,
[a]ny voluntary conduct suggests the presence of some motivation
to engage in such conduct, but the mere presence of desire or im-
pulse provides no suggestion of exculpatory or incapacitating sig-
nificance. Those who are greedy experience a strong desire for
wealth, but greed neither exculpates those who commit theft nor
suggests that they suffer disorder that renders them unable to con-
trol their acquisitive conduct or incompetent for any legal pur-
pose.165
Thus, the very categorization of sex offenders as “mentally ill” is at
issue.
(b)   Can Sexual Predators Be Treated?
The commitment of “sexual predators” has been criticized on the
basis that no effective treatment exists.166 These critics argue that
because no treatment is known, commitment cannot help cure the of-
fender and, hence, such commitment is merely incarceration.167
Commitment under these conditions is only one step away from pure
preventive detention.168 However, proponents of the statutes rightly
argue that the state is only required to attempt a cure, not to succeed
in curing the person committed.169 The fact that no cure is known
does not alter the fact that a disease exists, nor does it alter the
state’s authority to protect society.170
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On the other hand, psychiatrists argue that no treatment exists
because there is no “disease” to treat. If sexual predators do not suffer
from mental illness but, instead, have abnormal desires and make
cruel moral decisions, “treating” them would be like “treating” a per-
son for preferring to eat dog food rather than human food or for hat-
ing racial minorities.171 Thus, while it can be conceded that commit-
ment may be appropriate for mental illnesses even when effective
treatment is unknown, commitment is inappropriate if the problem
is inherently untreatable because it is not an illness.
3.   The Definition of “Mental Abnormality” in Sexual Predator
Commitment Acts Blurs the Distinction Between Criminal and
Insane
(a)   Treating Sexual Predators as Criminals
Some support the view that a sexual offender may suffer from an
antisocial personality disorder that is indistinguishable from anti-
social tendencies revealed in other types of offenders.172 This school of
thought denies that there is “mental illness” present in most sex of-
fenders because the offender’s thought processes and responses are
not affected.173 Following this school of thought, sex offenders should
be punished only as criminals and only through the criminal justice
system.174 Under this view of sexual predation, commitment would be
bald preventive detention, unknown to our system of jurisprudence,
or punishment in violation of the double jeopardy provision of the
U.S. Constitution.175
Defenders of the commitment acts point out that preventive de-
tention is always a motive for civil commitment; indeed, it is consti-
tutionally mandated in the “dangerousness” component of civil com-
mitment.176 Moreover, they argue that imposing longer criminal sen-
tences or increasing the sentences for multiple offenses are also
methods of preventive detention.177 While these points may be con-
ceded, the legitimacy of civil commitment is contingent upon the le-
gitimacy of categorizing sexual predators as mentally ill.
The Jimmy Ryce Act facially requires a condition that assertedly
satisfies the mental illness requirement; however, detractors claim
the Act is mistaken as to the nature of sexual predation, that it is
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173. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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circular, or is merely a pretext for further incarceration.178 Further,
these detractors note that “truly” mentally ill sex offenders—whose
mental processes are disturbed—would qualify for commitment un-
der ordinary commitment statutes.179 Other sex offenders, who are
responsible moral agents, are more appropriately addressed through
the criminal justice system.180 Otherwise, the foundation of our
criminal justice system—culpability—is undermined, and the pri-
mary function of the civil commitment system—therapeutic treat-
ment—is distorted.181
(b)   Treating Sexual Predators as Insane
The Jimmy Ryce Act assumes that sexual predators who are sub-
ject to the Act suffer from a bona fide mental illness and are suscep-
tible to treatment.182 Under the Act, sexual predators are defined by
a lack of volitional control over their actions due to mental illness.183
The Act’s assumptions logically lead to the conclusion that such per-
sons are incapable of criminal culpability as our system of jurispru-
dence understands it and, therefore, should be dealt with through
civil commitment. Moral culpability requires the volitional behavior,
which gives rise to the capability of choosing to act “recklessly,
knowingly, or purposefully.”184 Implicit in our system of criminal jus-
tice is the notion that responsibility requires cognitive capacity and
minimal self-control (volitional capacity).185 Minnesota Supreme
Court Justice Gardebring noted the incongruity in convicting a per-
son of a crime that requires mens rea, yet later confining that person
because he is mentally unable to control his actions: “I believe the
state cannot have it both ways.”186
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Florida, however, does not recognize lack of volitional control as
an insanity defense.187 Florida follows the M’Naghten Rule, under
which only those defendants who do not recognize right from wrong
may be acquitted by reason of insanity.188 This rule has been widely
criticized for not recognizing lack of volitional control as a defense.189
In fact, the American Law Institute changed its Model Penal Code to
include lack of volitional control as part of the insanity defense be-
cause volitional control is necessary to establish criminal culpabil-
ity.190 Thus, Florida’s new statutory scheme of committing offenders
only after they have been punished is consistent with its long-
standing rule that lack of volitional control does not diminish an of-
fender’s criminal culpability. The issue is whether the legislative
judgment that a sexual predator is a responsible moral agent (and
therefore criminally culpable) can be reconciled with the legislative
judgment that the same offender suffers from a mental abnormality
such that he or she should be separated from society by civil com-
mitment.
(c)   The Hybrid, “Bad-and-Mad” Approach
The sexual predator acts recently enacted in Florida, Kansas, and
other states create a new category of mental illness—a “mental ab-
normality” that its proponents claim satisfies the “mental illness”
component of civil commitment without diminishing the culpability
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aspect of criminal jurisprudence.191 Such statutory schemes attempt
to justify first punishing the convicted sex offender and, afterwards,
civilly committing him. A similar Minnesota statute provides for in-
voluntary commitment of “sexual psychopathic personalities” in lieu
of criminal confinement, but does not treat this condition as a de-
fense to a criminal charge, as occurs with legal mental insanity.192 In
defending this Minnesota statute, one commentator noted:
According to received doctrine, [a “sexual psychopath”] must be
placed in one of two legal categories: “mad” or “bad.” Under the
“mad” approach, if [a “sexual psychopath”] were determined to be
mentally ill and dangerous, the state could civilly commit him.
Under the “bad” approach, if [a “sexual psychopath”] were con-
victed of a crime, the state could imprison him. Thus, the law sets
up a paradigm of extremes: people who do terrible things to others
are either sick or evil. The difficulty is that, in reality, mental ill-
ness and wickedness do not exist as two opposite conditions with
nothing in between. Rather, “mad” and “bad” are the ends of a con-
tinuum upon which moral culpability varies according to the de-
gree of madness or badness in any one individual. Some offenders
are not easily classified as “mad” or “bad,” because they are, to
some degree, a little of both, that is, they are culpable for their
conduct to some extent, but also to some extent inculpable due to
the role that mental illness played in their conduct.193
Others have echoed this middling view of sexual predation, conclud-
ing that sex offenders are culpable because they know right from
wrong, but are rightfully committed because they “may be less able
than others to control their anti-social behavior.”194 Though these ar-
guments are subjective conclusions concerning the nature of sexual
predation and the relative culpability to be appropriately assigned in
light of that perceived nature, these commentators argue that these
are normative decisions that state legislatures are authorized to
make.195
V.   CONCLUSION
The Jimmy Ryce Act and other similar sexual predator commit-
ment acts are legislative attempts to resolve the recurring abhor-
rence of sexual violence. Since the nature of sexual predation is un-
known, and perhaps unknowable, the states are authorized to make
normative judgments as to the culpability of these offenders. How-
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ever, the Constitution imposes certain constrictions upon the state in
punishing its citizens. The history and substance of the Act unfortu-
nately reveal that the Act may be a punitive measure aimed at a par-
ticularly loathed class of criminals. Moreover, the Florida Legislature
failed to articulate, and subsequent history has not revealed, a the-
ory under which a sexually violent predator is culpable for an action,
and at the same time, mentally incapable of volitional control. The
Legislature’s failure to define the scope of sex offenders’ culpability
undermines the moral foundation of our criminal justice system
while similarly distorting the role of civil commitment. Nonetheless,
the Act at least facially requires a legitimate mental abnormality.
The challenge for the courts in the future will be to develop this defi-
nition on a case-by-case basis to truly limit the scope of the Act to
persons with bona fide mental illnesses. The courts must fashion an
interpretation of the Jimmy Ryce Act that will require some malfunc-
tion of the offender’s mind so that he may not be committed solely
due to his past acts for which he has already been punished. Moreo-
ver, to prevent substitution of the criminal justice system with civil
commitment, the definition must insure that the malfunction is dis-
tinguishable from mere criminal behavior. In this manner, the courts
will help insure that the criminal justice system will be neither
skewed nor averted.
